Abstract-As America and her Allies enter the 21st Century's Information Age; military operations are being transformed to address the new threats facing the global economy, such as Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Joint Urban Operations (JUO). At the heart of this transformation is a new theory of warfare, called Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This new theory can be subdivided into two main sections, infrastructure and operations. Network Centric Infrastructure (NCI) is comprised of all the networks, communications and information management applications required to "assure delivery" of data/information to the "right place at the right time in the right format". Network Centric Operations (NCO) is the series of processes and applications required by the Commander and staff in order to conduct military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To fully utilize NCO, the NCI must consist of a robust, adaptable series of services to ensure rapid dependable data/information flow from source to destination. This paper first provides an overview of NCW and its two basic sub-divisions, NCO and NCI. For NCW to be effective, it must be deeply rooted in operational art. Simply applying new technologies to the current platforms, organizations, and doctrine is not enough to fully realize NCW's potential in conducting military operations. To explore this premise, this paper discusses some of the challenges in transforming NCW into a real operational capability within the command and control (C2) environment, utilizing today's offensive and defensive information operations capability. Discussion of C2 applications such as Predictive Battlespace Awareness, Cyber Operations, and a concept called the Situational Awareness Infosphere is presented and how they apply to NCW. Lastly, a detailed example of how the situational awareness infosphere can be applied to space and how it is affected by NCW will be presented along with a corresponding list of technology challenges.
INTRODUCTION
We are in our sixth year of the War on Terrorism, a global effort by the United States government and several of our allied countries, to neutralize international groups it deems as "terrorist", and ensure "rogue nations" no longer support terrorist activities. This term was initially coined by President George W. Bush, and adopted as a consequence of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
The dynamic nature and military parameters of this conflict are to date, still being defined. How do you defend against rogue individuals and entities operating on misaligned principles with no apparent goal except to enact terror against innocent civilian populations? The doctrine required for this type of war violates the fundamental strategic principles of historic conflicts. Within the Information Age, the military requires a stronger or more dominant capability; such as Network Centric Warfare.
NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a logical transition from platform-centric warfare. The focus of NCW is networking battlespace entities (e.g., platforms with planners) so they can work in concert to achieve synergistic effects. NCW is about human and organizational behavior. The NCW value chain is shown in Figure 1 [1] . The postulates of NCW can be stated as follows [2] : 1) a robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2) information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3) shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization which enhances sustainability and speed of command; and these in turn, 4) dramatically increases mission effectiveness --the bottom line. Alberts, et. al., highlight the fact that NCW is based on adopting a new way of thinking, i.e., network centric thinking [1] .
Figure 1: The NCW Value Chain
Three attributes can be used to describe portions of NCW: "Build the net" (i.e.., the Global Information Grid), "Protect the net" (i.e., information assurance), and "Populate the net" (i.e., right information to the right place in the right format) with the end goal of bringing "Power to the Edge" [2] [3] . "Power to the Edge" is the ability of the total force to dynamically synchronize their actions in order to achieve Command and Control (C2) agility and increase the speed of command over a robust, networked grid that is not only well protected but allows any entity to join "the fight" in order to achieve a strategic/operational/tactical mission objective. In military organizations, power is a function of the collective means and opportunity to accomplish the following [3] : ability to make sense of a particular situation; ability to work in a coalition environment; possession of an appropriate means to respond; and, the ability to orchestrate the means to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. It is postulated that power to the edge organizations and architectures are more effective than current military hierarchies and systems that support them [3] . Conceptually, command and control can be represented as shown in Figure  2 [1] . Incorporating a "Power to the Edge" viewpoint, the dark line around information systems represents the "Information Edge". The goal, therefore, is to conduct/push information to the outermost region (i.e., lowest echelon) to achieve the maximum utility.
Figure 2: C2 Concept within NCW Construct
Within military operations, the location where command is performed can be thought of as the "center of gravity" of an operation. Within the NCW construct, the goal is to shift the "center of gravity" out as far as possible across the network, in order to achieve effective military power at the lowest echelons. This will effectively empower the lowest common denominator in a specific situation to cause a certain effect. C2 elements span four dimensions of warfare (physical, information, cognitive, and social). C2 sensors, systems, platforms, and facilities exist in the physical domain. The information collected, posted, pulled, displayed, processed, and stored exists in the information domain. The perceptions, cultural bias, and understanding of what this information states and means exist in the cognitive domain, as well as the mental models, preconceptions, biases, and values that serve to influence how information is interpreted and understood, as well as the nature of the responses that may be considered. [1] [2] [3] As mentioned earlier, NCW can be sub-divided into two major sections: network centric operations and network centric infrastructure, as shown in Figure 3 . For NCW to be effective, it must be deeply rooted in operational art. Simply applying new technologies to the current platforms, organizations, and doctrine are not enough to fully realize NCW's potential in conducting efficient military operations. It is within the network centric operations subdivision that NCW can be effectively realized within military operations. Mission operations are fundamentally a decentralized style of command, relying on initiative, the acceptance of responsibility and mutual trust [4] . With the movement towards NCW tenets the leadership style will move from centralized-control, decentralizedexecution to decentralized-control, decentralized-execution. The movement is to push leadership decisions as far out (i.e. "Power to the Edge") as possible to allow maximum utilization of available resources.
We see this shift in military operations today. Take the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) that conducts the Air Campaign for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). Over the past several years, they have shifted their strategy and assessment to encapsulate the basic tenets of NCW. The traditional "Kill Chain" is shifting from a sequential to a parallel series of events. This shift will significantly enhance operations within a dynamically changing environment, and will continue to do so in both the Global War of Terrorism (GWOT) and Joint Urban Operations (JUO).
It is the asymmetric threat that will continue to test the US and her Allies military might in the 21st Century. As indicated by John Russell [4] , "…in asymmetric warfare there is a total or extremely strong difference between the opponents' aims, capabilities, courses of action and moral codes…will use weapons and tactics in ways that are unplanned for or unexpected to foil, offset, reduce or circumvent technological superiority..." Consequently, command and control within the construct of NCW needs to be modified in order to be able to rapidly and decisively counter this type of encounter.
Network Centric Infrastructure
As shown in Figure 3 , network centric infrastructure (NCI) is that tier where the information management, information computing, information transport, and information assurance is conducted. As part of the Command and Control concept ( Figure 2 ) this is conducted primarily in the physical and information domains.
At the heart of NCI are information technologies [1] . It is the applications of information technologies that will enable the benefits of NCO of linking together battlespace entities [2] . NCW is built around the concept of sharing information and assets [2] . To make this happen, the "system" needs to not only be robust and dynamic but have such attributes as self-organizing and self-healing in order to guarantee that the "right information gets to the right entity at the right time".
Such implementations of information management, information assurance, information transport as well as advanced computing will be paramount in order to enable network centric operations in the "Information Age". To effectively utilize the "Power to the Edge" construct, the weapon of "information" has to find its way to the lowest echelons.
JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS
Although operations in an urban environment are not new, effectively managing multi-service forces, weapons, and tactics in a severely constrained environment is becoming more complex. Joint Urban Operations (JUO) are planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives layered with topographical complexities. Key concerns reside in the fact that JUO take place adjacent to natural terrain and man-made construction where the density of non-combatants is the dominant features. An urban area is as diverse as it is complex.
Historically, the US military has assorted experience conducting urban operations, from the Revolutionary War, Vietnam and to recent actions in Afghanistan. Urban areas are often the essential strategically important location of the enemy. Initially, urban areas were situated to defend key geographical chokepoints, supply lines, or lines of communication. Naturally, as these urban areas prospered, their populations and importance grew.
Information and time critical intelligence support every aspect of operations in urban areas and provides the basis for action throughout the range of military operations. Sources of intelligence should include a combination of human, electronic, and archival data, networked into a cohesive robust environment. Operations in the urban area require a number of non-traditional assets and human resources that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should consult to determine, direct, and coordinate missions.
CONCEPTS RELATING TO NCW
Consider the past 50+ years. There has been a major shift in how warfare is conducted. Evolving from platform-centric warfare, where the B-17, the F-4 and the FB-111 were the "epicenter" of power. Network-centric warfare is the next logical step, where information systems are providing for the first time a semi-dynamic air situational awareness picture across platforms. Given the state of the art in warfare, new constructs are possible that were not possible as little as five years ago, e.g., self-synchronization of ground, air and sea forces.
As the military services exploit the Information Age, doctrine and tactics are changing to reflect rapid advancements in technology. Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is the current term used to describe the way the military services organize and fight in the Information Age. Network-Centric-Warfare is based on human and organizational behavior -a new way of thinking -a new mental model. Its premise is pushing "information to the edge" and its focus is on combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or networking of the warfighting enterprise.
4
Information is the key part of human competition. Those possessing this weapon have always had a substantial advantage on the battlefield. History is full of examples of how the right information at the right time has decided the course of the battle, just as it has shown the importance of networks. Effective C2 remains a substantial target for IO. Commercial communications systems linked to friendly and adversary networks offer unique challenges from both an offensive targeting task to a defensive protection point of view. Policy coupled with the rapid growth of networks and technological advancements make it very difficult to pinpoint adversary intrusions. The military is quickly recognizing the importance of maintaining a superior information advantage, and creating advancements in information operations.
This section provides some examples of the C2 concept (see Figure 2 ) and applies them to predictive battlespace awareness, cyber operations and situational awareness. Utilizing situational awareness as a base, a specific concept is discussed, namely space situational awareness and how a total "infosphere" can be developed utilizing the NCW's C2 concept. The last section discusses some of the key information technology challenges regarding these concepts.
Predictive Battlespace Awareness
Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA) is a state of mind that is achieved and maintained by a commander through active participation in the "predictive process" [5] . In 2002, the AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) conducted a PBA Study and concluded that PBA is a transformation concept and is critical to achieving full spectrum dominance in the battlespace [5] . This "state of mind" is a very complex issue and will require changes in not only architectures and technology, but in the very culture and organizations of the military services.
PBA can be thought of as a "multi-dimensional understanding of the battlespace in time, space, and effect regardless of the adversary, location, environment, or time of day. This understanding is continuous, and is achieved and maintained by the commander through possession of relevant, comprehensive, thorough knowledge, including an accurate forecast of pertinent influences within the battlespace." [5] Within the C2 concept (see Figure 2) , PBA can also be framed into three distinct "bubbles" as shown in Figure 4 . However, at the heart of PBA is the development of what is called "Futures" (shown as the intersection of the Prediction, Monitoring, and Management "bubbles"). Operationally, PBA operates in the tactical, operational and strategic domains. Additionally, as with the C2 concept, there must be "interoperability", "cohesion", "coupling" and "integration" within these three domains for PBA to be successful. Network Warfare Operations; which is arguably the area with the biggest growth potential. Air Force doctrine applies a similar construct to Network Warfare Ops: included are offensive (Network Attack), defensive (Network Defense), the network analysis portion (Network Forensics) and specialized intelligence and other support (Network Warfare Support).
Cyber operations deal with the part of information and network warfare operations that include the following four tenets:
Information Assurance comprises those measures to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Computer Network Defense is actions taken to plan and direct responses to unauthorized activity in defense of AF information systems and computer networks. Computer Network Attack operations are conducted using information systems to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Computer Network Exploitation operations are Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) functions in cyberspace that result in the ability to gather information about the adversary, their intentions, and their capabilities.
Within cyber operations, there is a new, evolving concept called "Cyber C2"; which, in reality can be thought of as an extension to the traditional philosophy of "Observe-OrientDecide-Act" or OODA Loop. Within the AF, the OODA Loop concept has been slightly modified into the Command and Control construct of Monitor-Assess-Plan-Execute (MAPE); which, in turn has been adopted by the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) in conducting an air campaign. Therefore, one can think of "Cyber C2" as just an extension of traditional C2. There are a lot of similarities between the air and cyber domains as shown in Table 1 . Within the C2 concept (see Figure 2) , cyber operations can be framed into three distinct "bubbles" as shown in Figure  5 . It is postulated that the only difference between Figure 2 and Figure 5 is the domain to which the operations is being conducted. The command and control is the same. As a matter of fact, they should be thought of as being robustly integrated and transparent. Under the effects-based operations concept, the cyber domain can be thought of as just an extension of the other domains. In the Information Age, the cyber domain will become a dominant force in conducting military operations.
Figure 5: Cyber Operations within NCW Construct

Situational Awareness
Situation Awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. [5] The US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) defines situational awareness as "the ability to have accurate real-time information of friendly, enemy, neutral, and non-combatant locations; a common, relevant picture of the battlefield scaled to specific levels of interest and special needs." [7] Dr. Endsley has developed a conceptual model of situational awareness that takes into account three levels (perception, comprehension and projection) as shown in Figure 6 [6] . This model has become a foundation to developing situational awareness concepts and applications.
Taking these concepts into account, Figure 7 illustrates how situational awareness fits into the NCW construct. As shown, the key areas are in the monitoring "bubble" to develop a clear awareness and understanding of the environment. In this context, the environment covers not only ground/air/space/cyber environment, but particulars on red/blue/grey/white forces and entities as well 
Space Situational Awareness
An important challenge for the space community today is that of space situational awareness. Figure 7 provides an overall conceptual view of situational awareness. This concept can easily be adapted to cover space situational awareness, since it's just a subset of the overall situational awareness infosphere. Figure 8 illustrates simplified space architecture. Crucial to its success would be utilizing the concepts of the Joint Battlespace Infosphere (JBI) as an information management system. The space awareness infosphere can be thought of as those elements that make up the space architecture as depicted in Figure 7 .
[8] The Space Awareness Infosphere (SAI) can be broken down into three major areas. The first part, decision support, is the collection of tools and applications that allows a decision maker to convert the incoming data (from the scores of sensors located on space, air and ground platforms) into information and knowledge in order for him/her to make intelligent decisions. The second part is the information management, in that the system has to manage the vast amounts of information that a decision maker needs. The third and last part of the SAI is the system that gets the information from the edge of the system to the decision maker in a timely manner. This is the global information grid. Each part is discussed below.
Decision Support
The decision support portion of the Space Awareness Infosphere (SAI) would be tasked with rapidly exploiting superior, consistent knowledge of the battlespace in order to make faster, better-informed and more accurate decisions in complex uncertain environments. This capability would provide commanders the capability to shape and control the pace and phasing of engagements. Within the Space Awareness Infosphere, the decision support portion must take into account the following items:
Minimal decision cycles Offensive/Defensive space situational changes Real-time assessment of information assurance attacks Seamless assimilation of a terabytes of information objects Multi-level security Joint and Coalition operations
Information Management
Information management within the space awareness infosphere would be critical for successful implementation. A major program conducted within the Information Directorate of the AF Research Laboratory is a program called the Joint Battlespace Infosphere (JBI). The JBI utilizes a publish/subscribe construct within the Space Awareness Infosphere and would operate in the following manner. Using Figure 8 as the generic space architecture, an external sensor aboard satellite-x picks up an "out of scale" reading regarding an approaching object. The intelligent sensor would immediately "publish" the report onto the "space infosphere". The other portions of the space system (ground, air, space, cyber) would be "subscribers" of information that they, individually, would deem important. The mission ground station receives the report and immediately sends out (publishes) via intelligent agents, requests for additional information regarding this approaching object. Other sensors then would focus on this object and "publish" reports of their findings. The mission ground station would be the recipient of all the reports from the various sensors. A decision would be made (e.g., do nothing, monitor more, perform evasive maneuver) and the mission ground station would "publish" the action. The original satellite (satellite-x) would also be a "subscriber" of the information on the space infosphere so it could then retrieve the report and take appropriate action.
Global Information Grid
As implied in Figure 8 , digital information is rapidly becoming integrated into all aspects of space activities (as illustrated by the ground-to-space, space-to-space and space-to-air links). The figure below provides what is driving today's communications requirements. The Global Information Grid can be thought of being segmented into three portions. The first would be the Ground Segment. The second is the airborne segment. The third is the space segment. Each of these three segments would contribute towards a total awareness sphere surrounding the space system.
The objective of the Global Information Grid, within the Space Awareness Infosphere, would be to establish a very high capacity, integrated air/space/ground/cyber network infrastructure for supporting the overall space operational missions. The Global Information Grid would provide the end-users (e.g., mission ground station, intelligent sensors) with bandwidth on demand; internet-like services; a machine-to-machine interface; be rapidly allocable to changing environments, be totally secure, and have the ability to create self-organizing private networks for various space user applications.
Using Figure 8 as an example, the Global Information Grid would provide the following:
Connectivity: provide links that connect to the network; Flexible, self-organizing self-managing networks that are interconnected; A unique address: users uniquely connected to the grid. For example, a space vehicle would have a URL, as would a Mission Ground Station; High capacity connectivity that would provide efficient RF links, bandwidth-on-demand, and high capacity wireless services; and, Guaranteed quality of service (QoS). 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
To implement the concepts discussed in this paper will require new avenues regarding information technologies. Taking each of the domains as shown in Figure 2 , some of the key technologies are: 
SUMMARY
Information operations are conducted across the range of military operations, from peace to war. Information superiority is a critical part of air and space superiority, defined as that degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.
Gaining and maintaining information superiority today has monumental repercussions and maintaining vital elements of a fully integrated kinetic and non-kinetic effects-based operation is how conflicts will be won tomorrow. Information Operations and Network Centric Infrastructure are both a critical capability and a potential vulnerability across the spectrum of military operations.
Network Centric Warfare is a new theory of warfare for the Information Age. It is envisioned that this new theory of warfare will bring new changes to the manner in which warfare is conducted. This is most evident when considering the aspects of information operations in the conduct of military operations. Within the NCW construct, numerous other operations (e.g., C2, PBA, cyber operations, situational awareness) can be conceptually defined.
Much needs to be accomplished in order to implement NCW into military operations. Within the NCO construct, changes in processes need to be accomplished in order to reap the most out of NCW's collaboration and synchronization attributes. Within NCI, advancements in information assurance, communications, and networks have to be accomplished in order to be able to deliver the "right information to the right place in the right time and format".
Lastly, a host of technologies need to be pursued in order for NCW to become a reality. Most importantly are those technologies dealing with behaviors, modelling, predicting, information management (publish/subscribe), self-healing and self-organizing networks.
